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[So F. No. 19740. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1958.]

BROOKEE KUBON, Appellant, v. WALTER KUBON,
Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Presumptions-Sufiicienc:y of Evidence.-Where an
appeal is on the judgment roll, which does not contain the
evidence before the trial court, it will be conclusively presumed
that the evidence supports the findings, such as findings that
a restraining order was duly served on plaintiff and that all
allegations of the answer were true.
[i] DepositiollS-Compliance With Statute.-In an action to recover on a Nevada money judgment based on orders in a
Nevada divorce decree requiring defendant to pay for child
support, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's
motion for a commission to examine witnesses in Nevada in
the absence of evidence to show that plaintiff complied with
Code Civ. Proe., 112024,2025 or 202!;lh, relating to the manner
of taking depositions out of the atate.
[8] Trial-Order of Procedure-Disposition of Issuea.-In an action to recover on a Nevada money judgment based on orders
in a Nevada divorce decree requiring defendant to pay for
child support, the trial court did not err in not hearing
defendant's plea in abatement prior to hearing the ease, since
Code Civ. Proe., 1597, provides only that if the answer raises
a plea in abatement the eourt "may," on motion of either party,
proceed to the trial of such special defense before the trial of
any other issue in the ease.
[4] Abatement-Trial-A plea in abatement may be heard either
before the trial of the other issues or along with the trial of
the other issues, and if the latter procedure is followed the
trial court may, after the trial, grant the plea in abatemenL
[6] Id.-Waiver.-A defendant does not waive his plea in abatement by not insisting that it be tried separately and prior to
the issues on the merits.

APPEAL from a judgm.ent of the Superior Court of Karin
County. Thomas F. Keating, Judge. Affirmed.
[3] See Oal.lur., Trial, 1§l7, 18; Am.lur., Trial, 154 et eeq.
[4] See Oal.lm.ili, Abatement and Revival, 155.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, 111144, 1150;
[2] Dcpositions, §4; [3] Trial, 120; [4] Abatement, 178; [5]
Abatcment, 176.
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Action to recover on a Nevada money judgment based on
orders in a divorce judgment requiring defendant to pay for
child support. Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Robert W. Corlett for Appellant.
Bruce B. Bales for Respondent.
McCOMB, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment denying
her recovery on a Nevada money judgment which was based
on orders in a divorce decree requiring defendant to pay support for their two minor children. The appeal is on the judgment roll and certain exhibits of a documentary nature that
were requested in the notice of appeal as provided in rule 5a
of the Rules on Appeal (36 Ca1.2d 5).
The record discloses the following:
i. March 27, 1952, the parties were divorced in the District
Court of Clark County, Nevada, which court had personal
jurisdiction of the parties. Pursuant to an agreement between
them, their property rights were settled and legal custody
of the two minor children was given to both, physical custody
being awarded to plaintiff. Defendant was ordered to pay
$100 per month for child support. The court reserved "jurisdiction to make such other and further Orders with respect
.to the care, custody, support and maintenance of the said
minor children as from time to time may seem meet and
proper."
.
ii. August 27, 1953, on a motion to change the custody of
the children, the Nevada court made an order allowing delendant their physical custody during the summer vacation.
iii. August 3, 1954, defendant filed a petition in the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County
of Marin, seeking appointment as guardian of the children.
At the time this petition was filed the children were residing
with him in his San Rafael residence under his lawful custody
pursuant to a Nevada custody order.
Upon the filing of this petition, the Superior Court of Marin
County issued its temporary restraining order restraining
plaintiff from taking the minor children from defendant's
custody or from defendant's San Rafael home pending the
hearing on the petition. This restraining order was duly
served upon plaintiff on August 5, 1954.
iv. In October 1954 the Nevada court again modified the
order for custody, taking away from defendant the right to
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t.he summer custody of the children and awarding their full
custody to plaintiff, with the right of reasonable visitation in
Nevada to defendant.
v. Support payments for September 1954 to June 1955
were not made by defendant. Pursuant to chapter 128 of the
Statutes of Nevada, plaintiff thereafter made a motion to
reduce the delinquent support payments to a formal judgment. The court ordered service of the notice of motion on
defendant by registered mail, return receipt requested. Defendant made no personal appearance, and judgment was entered against him for $1,000, plus $250 attorney's fees and
, $10 costs.
; vi. September 18, 1955, plaintiff filed a complaint in Marin
'County, California, to establish the Nevada judgment as a
judgment of this state.
; vii. October 17, 1955, defendant filed an answer in which he
admitted submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the Nevada
court in all proceedings except the last one and admitted the
nonpayment of, and his ability to pay, the support during the
10-month period involved in the judgment.
Defendant set up, among others, the affirmative defense that
it would be against public policy to enforce the judgment in
California because plaintiff did not come into court with
"clean hands." He alleged that she was in contempt of the
very court whose aid she was seeking, in that she had violated
the temporary custody and restraining order issued in the
guardianship proceeding which was filed in Marin County in
August 1954 and was still pending; that she had kidnaped the
children from his San Rafael home on August 20, 1954, and
taken them into Nevada, where they had been concealed in an
abandoned mine in the desert; that as a direct result of her
'wrongful conduct the Nevada court made the child support
order and the judgment bas~d thereon which she was endeavoring to enforce in the instant action; and, further, that she
had never appeared nor purged herself of contempt in such
proceeding and should not be 'permitted to profit from her
own wrongdoing.
viii. October 21, 1955, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the
foregoing affirmative defense, which motion was denied by
the trial judge.
ix. After trial, the judge found dlat t.he allegations set forth
above in defendant's affirmative defense were true and denied
plaintiff recovery on the Nevada judgment.
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QU6Stiom: First. Did the Irial court err in denying plainliff'. motion to .trike defendant's affirmative defense .et forth
above'
No. It is contended that there was no personal service of
the restraining order on plaintiff and no hearing thereon was
held within 10 days, as a result of which the restraining order
was void, and that the action of the trial court in denying
plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's affirmative defense set
forth above was therefore error.
[1] However, Andings of fact made by the trial court
refute these arguments. Since the present appeal is upon
the judgment roll and does not contain the evidence before
the trial court, it will be conclusively presumed that the evidence sustained the Andings. (Hunt v. Plavsa, 103 Cal.App.
2d 222, 224 [1] [229 P.2d 482] ; Estate of Larson, 92 Cal.App.
2d 267, 268 [1] [206 P.2d 852]; ct. Reid v. Valley Restaurants, Inc., 48 Ca1.2d 606, 609 [2] [311 P.2d 473].)
Accordingly, in the instant ease, the Anding of the trial
court that "said restraining order was duly served upon"
plaintiff on August 5, 1954, is presumed to. be supported by
competent evidence.
Likewise, there is nothing in the record to show that a hearing was not held within 10 days after the issuance of the order,
and the trial court's finding that aU the allegations of the
answer were true (one of the allegations being that said order
was "still pending in the Marin County Superior Court") is
presumed to be supported by the evidence.
[S]Second. Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff'.
motion for a commission to examine toifn6Sses in N 6vada'
No. There is a total absence of any evidence in the record
to show that plaintiff complied with sections 2024, 2025 or
2025% of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, there is
no affirmative showing of error upon the part of the trial
court.
[3] Third. Did tke trial court err in not hearing defendant's affirmative defense, whick constituted a plea in abate-I
ment, prior to trying the case'
No. Section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
only that if the answer raises a plea in abatement "the court
may, upon the motion of either party, proceed to the trial of
such special defense • . • before the trial of any other issue.
in the ease . . . . " (Italics added.)
[4] It is clear that a plea in abatement may be heard either
before the trial of other issues or along with the trial of

)
)
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ot.hp.r issues and th8t if the latt.er procedure is followed,
the trial court may, aCter the trial, grant the plea in abatement.
[5] There is no rule of law to the dect that a defendant
waives his plea in abatement by not insisting that it be tried
separately and prior to the issues on the merits.
The judgment is aftirmed.
Shenk,

J.~

Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Plaintiff brought this action to establish as a judgment
in this state, a Nevada judgment for accrued arrearages for
child support, attorney's fees and costs. The Nevada judgment was based on the modification order of October, 1954,
which continued in dect defendant's previously adjudicated
obligation to pay plaintiff $100 per month for child support.
It is undisputed that the Nevada court had personal jurisdiction over defendant to enter the October, 1954 order and
that its jurisdiction was continuing. Accordingly, it had
jurisdiction to enter the judgment for arrearages if adequate
notice to defendant was given. (LBWis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d
389,395-396 [317 P.2d 987], and authorities cited.)
: The Nevada court provided that notice should be served on
defendant "by registered mail, return receipt requested,"
and the conclusion of the trial court herein that the Nevada
court did not acquire jurisdiction was based on its 1lnding that
uno return receipt bearing defendant's eignature has ever
been presented." The order fixing the kind of notice to be
given, however, did not require a return receipt signed by'
defendant personally and the return receipt in the record,
eigned "Walter J. Kuhon by Charlotte G. Kuhon," supports
the recital of the Nevada judgment that "evidence [of service
had] • .'. been introduced" and the Nevada court's assumption of jurisdiction. Service by. registered mail was reasonably calculated to give defendant notice of the proceedings
(see Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 [66 S.Ct. 556, 90
L.Ed. 635]), and there is no finding that defendant had no
actual notice of them. (See Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Cal.2d 389
396 [317 P.2d 987].)
Nor can the Nevada judgment be attacked on the ground
that plaintiff may have been in contempt of the custody and
support order on which it was based. Whether or not plaintiff's denial of defendant's visitation right was a defense to

)
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her ~laim tor the support payments was for the Nevada court
to det.erminr. when plaintiff sought judgment for the :arrearages (sec Closset v. Clossct, 71 Nev. 80 [280 l'.2d 290, 291] ;
re Elmer's Guardianship, 125 N;J.Eq. 148 [4 A.2d 387,
388] ; Me·issller v. Meissner, 323 Ill.App. 299 [55 N.E.2d 312] ;
.Anderson v . .Anderson, 207 Minn. 338 [291 N.W. 508, 509];
88 A.L.R. 199; 105 A..L.R. 901), and that question is now
foreclosed by that judgment.
The crucial question therefore is whether plaintiff's removal
of the children from defendant's custody in violation of the
temporary restraining order issued by the California court
prior to the October, 1954 Nevada custody and support order
is a defense to plaintiff's action on the valid Nevada judgment for arrearages due pursuant to the latter order. It is
my opinion that recognition of such defense violates the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
a statc may not vindicate its own policy by refusing enforcement of a sister state judgment for the payment of money
on ·the ground that its recognition would violate the policy of
the state where enforcement is sought. (Morris v. Jones, 329
U.S. 545, 553 [67 8.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488, 168 A.L.R. 656] ;
Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 291 [59 8.Ot. 557, 83 L.Ed.
653] ; Rocke v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 451-452 [48 S.Ot. 142,
72 L.Ed. 365, 53 A.L.R. 1141]; Fauntleroy v. lIum, 210 U.S.
230,236 [28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039].) It has pointed out
that in the case of valid final judgments for the payment of
money, the exceptions to the full faith and credit clause ·are·
rare or nonexistent (Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 553 [67·
S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488, 168 A.L.R. 656] ; MagnoZia PetroZeum
Co. v. Hunt, 820 U.S. 430, 438 [64 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed. 149, 150
A.L.R. 413]), and it has held that a "state which may not·
constitutionally refuse to open its courts to a suit on a judgment of another state because of the nature of the cause of
action merged in the judgment I citation], obviously cannot,
by the adoption of a particular rule of liability or of procedure, exclude from its courts a suit on the judgment."
(Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 292 [59 8. Ct. 557, 83 L.Ed;
653].) Accordingly, just as we cannot directly refuse full
faitb and credit to the Nevada judgmE'ut becam~e the Nevada
court failed to give effect to our policy of not a!;sisting a
contemptuous litigant, we cannot invoke thnt policy as a rule
of procedure to sustain a plea in abatement to a suit on that
judgment.

'n
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At the time the Nevada order of October, 1954 and the
judgment based thereon were entered, plaintiff was already
in contempt of the California court. That fact was for the
Nevada court to consider in entering its order and subsequent
judgment. Moreover, even had the California order such
dignity as to compcl its recognition in Nevada under the fun
faith and credit clause, a final judgment entered in disregard
of it could not now be denied enforcement here. (Treinics
v. Sunshine Min. Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 [60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed.
85] ; Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Ca1.2d 389, 393 [317 P.2d 987].)
If in the face of the Nevada judgment the California court
could not vindicate respect for its own judicial processes that
had been erroneously denied full faith and credit, a fortiori,
. it cannot do so when those processes are not entitled to full
faith and credit.- Any doubt is set at rest by Morris v.
Jones, 329 U.S. 545 [67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488, 168 A.L.R.
656]. In that case a Missouri judgment was obtained in
direct violation of an Illinois injunction against prosecuting
the action. The court held that the time to determine the
effect of the Illinois injunction was in the Missouri action
and that although it had been given no effect therein, the
defendant was precluded by the full faith and credit clause
from attacking the final Missouri judgment when plaintiff
sought to establish' it in Illinois.
Even if we were 110t constitutionally compelled to reject
defendant's plea in abatement based on plaintiff's contempt
of the temporary restraining order, we should reject it on its
own merits. After the temporary restraining order was
issued, the parties fully litigated the questions of custody and
child support in Nevada. Nevada was the state primarily
concerned with the children's welfare. Their custody had
theretofore been awarded pursuant to a Nevada decree, they
had lived in Nevada during the previous school year, and
they had returned to Nevada and presumably reentered
school there. It must be presum~d that the Nevada court
concluded that tlH~ir best interests dictated that they should
remain with their mother there and that defendant should
continue to contribute to their support. The Nevada court
·Since it was not a final judgment, the temporary restraining order
was not entitled to full fllitll and credit under existing law (see discussion in Worthley v. Worthley, 44 CIl1.2d 46", 468-469 f283 P.2d 191)
Hen if it is assllmt'd thnt if final it would he entitleu to slIell II roteeti on.
(See Equitable Life .A.sslir. Boc. v. Gex' Estate, 184 Mi~s. 577 [186 So.
6;;!l, 664]; Frye v. Chicago, B. I. 4' P. By. Co., 157 Minn. 52 [195 N.W.
62!l, 632J.)
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did not err in placing the welfare of the clUldl'eD above the
desirability of compelling plaintiff to respect the order of the
California court. (See Lerner v. 8*penor Co*rt, 38 Cal.
2d 676, 682 [242 P.2d 321], and uses cited.) Surely after
this litigation and the Nevada court's determination that the
children should stay where they were, it 1US not incumbent
on plaintiff to set that order at "!taught, ~~e the children
from school, and return them to California solely to vindicate
the dignity of our court and pmge herself of contempt.
None of the cases involving -the rule that relief should be
denied to a contemptous litigant involved facts such as these.
Moreover, many of them indicate that the true basis for the
rnle is to compel obedience, not to work an automatic forfeiture of whatever rights may be involved. Thus, in both
Krog v. Krog, 32 Cal.2d 812 [198 P.2d 510], and Borenstein
v. Borenstei'1l, 11 Ca1.2d 301 [79 P.2d 388], it was held that
a stay of proceedings until the appellant complied with the
court's order, not a dismissal of his appeal, was the proper
remedy for his contempt. (See also In re Bauman, 82 Cal.
App.2d 359, 364 [186 P.2d 154].) When as in this case,
plaintiff can purge herself of contempt only by uprooting the
children in prejudice of their best interests as determined by
the Nevada court after a full adversary hearing, belated compliance cannot be justified. Nor is the forfeiture of her rights
and those of the children fit punishment for her past wrong.
(See Allen v. Allen, 138 Cal.App.2d 706, 708-709 [292 P.2d
5811.)
I would reverse the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
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